The Air Supremacy Myth Is Over: Why Western Militaries Can No Longer Assume They Own the Skies
For decades, Western military operations have been built on a simple assumption: that when conflict erupts, control of the air is a given. The 1991 Gulf War, NATO operations in the Balkans, the early phases of Afghanistan and Iraq—all featured overwhelming air superiority that allowed ground forces to operate with near-impunity. But that era is ending.
As Air Vice-Marshal Ian “Cab” Townsend, assistant chief of the air staff of the British Royal Air Force, put it starkly at the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society: “Control of the air is not a given.”
It’s a warning that should make every defense strategist, every defense contractor, and every revenue team in the defense tech ecosystem stop and recalibrate their GTM playbooks. Because if the battlefield assumptions change, the entire market changes with them.
The Historical Anomaly of Western Air Dominance
Let’s be blunt: the last 30 years of Western air dominance were a historical outlier, not a permanent state of affairs.
Townsend described these conflicts as “historical anomalies.” For good reason. Since the end of the Cold War, the US and its allies have fought wars against opponents with limited air forces—no integrated air defense systems, no drone swarms, no peer-level electronic warfare capabilities. The result? Air superiority was effectively pre-ordained.
But that’s not how war works in contested environments. “History consistently teaches us that fighting without control of the air is dangerous,” Townsend observed. “Control of the air is the duty of an air force. With it, anything is possible. Without it, everything is dangerous.”
The key data point here: the war in Ukraine has now run for over two years, and neither side has achieved air superiority. That’s not a fluke—it’s a structural reality of modern warfare.
Ukraine’s Blueprint: Why Air Superiority Is Now So Elusive
Ukraine has become the world’s most instructive case study in contested airspace. Here’s what makes it different from every Western conflict since 1991:
Dense integrated air defense systems (IADS) : Both Russia and Ukraine field layered air defenses—short-range, medium-range, and long-range systems that make it nearly impossible for aircraft to operate freely at any altitude. The modern IADS environment, Townsend said, “is becoming increasingly complex and ambiguous.”
The drone revolution: Townsend captured this shift perfectly: “Over the last decade, we’ve had to contend with little green men on the ground, and now we are increasingly dealing with little grey drones in the air. Democratized air power is liberating and simultaneously challenging.”
Drones are cheap, abundant, and lethal. They’ve turned the airspace into a 24/7 threat zone. No aircraft—manned or unmanned—is safe. No airbase is secure. No supply route is guaranteed.
Missile proliferation: Advanced surface-to-air missiles, from shoulder-fired MANPADS to strategic SAMs, now saturate the battlefield. Combined with drones and counter-battery radar, they create a kill web that is “contested and dangerous at nearly every altitude,” as Townsend described.
The result? Ground forces in Ukraine—whether mounted in tanks or dismounted as infantry—face constant air threats. Tanks have struggled to survive because they lack the air cover that was standard in Western doctrine. This isn’t a one-off tactical problem; it’s a systemic operational shift.
The Three Freedoms at Stake
Why does control of the air matter so much? Townsend broke it down into three distinct freedoms:
- Freedom of initiative —The ability to choose when, where, and how to engage the enemy.
- Freedom to operate —The ability to move forces and supplies without being interdicted.
- Freedom to maneuver —The ability to reposition forces to exploit vulnerabilities or avoid threats.
Without air control, all three freedoms evaporate. Ground forces become reactive. Logistics become constrained. Surprise becomes impossible.
“If control of the air benefits the other physical domains by giving them the freedom of initiative, the freedom to operate, and the freedom to maneuver,” Townsend said, then its absence does the exact opposite.
For B2B and defense tech companies, this has a direct market implication: the demand for solutions that help forces earn and maintain air control—rather than assume it—will skyrocket.
The Criticality Is Born Out of Bitter Experience
Townsend’s most sobering line was this: “The criticality of control of the air is born out of bitter experience.”
Western militaries have not had bitter experience with contested airspace for a generation. But Ukraine has provided a harsh refresher course, and the lessons are being learned in real time.
What does that mean for defense procurement? A fundamental shift in priorities:
- Electronic warfare capabilities become just as important as kinetic ones.
- Decoys, counter-drones, and passive defense become standard, not niche.
- Distributed command and control becomes non-negotiable.
- Survivability over pure performance specs becomes the driving metric.
This isn’t about buying more F-35s or F-15EXs. It’s about rethinking the entire air ecosystem. “Control of the air is earned,” Townsend emphasized. “It must be fought for relentlessly and maintained every single minute of every single day.”
What This Means for Defense Tech GTM
If you’re a revenue leader selling into the defense and aerospace market, this shift is your tailwind. Here are the concrete implications:
1. Air Dominance Has Become a 24/7 Operational Problem
The old model: gain air superiority in the first 72 hours, then operate freely. The new model: fight for it every minute of every day. That creates ongoing demand for:
- Persistent air domain awareness systems
- Automated threat detection and response
- Resilient and redundant communications
- Low-cost attritable drones that can be expended while maintaining mission tempo
2. The Buyer Persona Has Diversified
Townsend’s remarks were aimed at the air force, but the solutions are no longer limited to air force budgets. Ground forces, special operations, and logistics commands all need tools to operate despite contested airspace. That widens the addressable market for any company building counter-UAS, electronic warfare, or passive air defense products.
3. Demos and Proof Points Must Reflect Reality
If you’re pitching to NATO or allied defense customers, don’t show them PowerPoint slides of 1991-style “air supremacy.” Show them how your solution performs in the Ukrainian environment—dense IADS, drone swarms, electronic attacks, and constant attrition. Buyers are now educated by real-world combat data.
4. The “Democratization of Air Power” Is Both a Threat and an Opportunity
Townsend noted that democratized air power is “liberating and simultaneously challenging.” For incumbents, it’s a threat to legacy platforms. For disruptors, it’s a massive opportunity. Small, agile companies can now build drone-based solutions that were previously the domain of primes. The entry barriers are lower than ever.
The Inconvenient Truth: No One Gets a Free Pass
The article’s source material quotes Townsend asserting that “control of the air is not a given.” That’s not a hypothetical warning—it’s an operational reality that Western militaries must now confront.
The historical anomaly of the last three decades is over. The next conflict—whether against a near-peer competitor or a well-armed non-state actor—will be fought in contested airspace from day one.
The actionable takeaway for defense tech companies: Build for the world that exists, not the world that used to exist. That means solutions that help forces earn, fight for, and maintain air control every minute of every day.
Because as Townsend reminded his audience, “with control of the air, anything is possible. Without it, everything is dangerous.”
And in the defense tech market, those who solve for the most dangerous problems win the biggest budgets.